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Abstract Mature information societies are characterised by mass production of data
that provide insight into human behaviour. Analytics (as in big data analytics) has arisen
as a practice to make sense of the data trails generated through interactions with
networked devices, platforms and organisations. Persistent knowledge describing the
behaviours and characteristics of people can be constructed over time, linking individ-
uals into groups or classes of interest to the platform. Analytics allows for a new type of
algorithmically assembled group to be formed that does not necessarily align with
classes or attributes already protected by privacy and anti-discrimination law or ad-
dressed in fairness- and discrimination-aware analytics. Individuals are linked according
to offline identifiers (e.g. age, ethnicity, geographical location) and shared behavioural
identity tokens, allowing for predictions and decisions to be taken at a group rather than
individual level. This article examines the ethical significance of such ad hoc groups in
analytics and argues that the privacy interests of algorithmically assembled groups in
inviolate personality must be recognised alongside individual privacy rights. Algorith-
mically grouped individuals have a collective interest in the creation of information
about the group, and actions taken on its behalf. Group privacy is proposed as a third
interest to balance alongside individual privacy and social, commercial and epistemic
benefits when assessing the ethical acceptability of analytics platforms.
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1 Introduction1
Mature information societies are characterised by mass production of data that provide
insight into human behaviour (Floridi 2016b). Data analytics has arisen to make sense
of the data trails generated through interactions with networked devices, platforms and
organisations (Burrell 2016; Grindrod 2014). Users are understood through small
patterns or correlations with others in the system, by which individuals are clustered
into meaningful groups (or classes) according to their behaviour, preferences and other
characteristics 2 (Schermer 2011; Hildebrandt 2008). Analytics informs immediate
responses to the needs and preferences of users as well as longer-term strategic
planning and development by service and platform providers (Grindrod 2014).
Decision-making in areas such as risk stratification, credit scoring, search and media
filtration, market segmentation, employment, policing and criminal sentencing is now
routinely informed by analytics.
Analytics allows persistent knowledge describing the behaviours and characteristics
of people to be constructed over time, forming individuals into meaningful groups or
classes. Individuals are linked according to offline identifiers (e.g. age, ethnicity,
geographical location) and new behavioural identity tokens, allowing for predictions
and decisions to be taken at a group rather than individual level (Grindrod 2014). These
digital collective identifiers disrupt the long-standing link between the individual,
identity and privacy.
Similar to individual privacy interests, algorithmically grouped individuals have a
collective interest in how information describing the group is generated and used.
However, equivalent privacy rights and duties do not exist for such ad hoc groups
created by analytics. In this article, I examine the feasibility of granting algorithmically
assembled groups a right to privacy. The article does not define a general theory of
group privacy but instead examines the case for granting a specific informational
privacy right—the right to inviolate personality—to ad hoc groups. This right would
stand in contrast (but not opposition) to protections afforded to identifiable individuals
in privacy and data protection law.
In international law, groups are defined by a shared background (e.g. culture or
collective purpose). Such purposeful collectives are granted rights, including the right
to assemble (e.g. Bloustein 1976; Bisaz 2012). In contrast, I argue that algorithmically
constructed ad hoc groups lacking a shared background should also have their interests
in privacy formally recognised by being granted a limited right to manage the group’s
identity. Group privacy is proposed as a third interest to balance with individual privacy
rights and the social, commercial and epistemic benefits of analytics. While privacy-,
fairness- and discrimination-aware analytics techniques have gone some way to protect
the interests of such groups, a group privacy right would demand the scope of such
techniques and legal privacy protections be expanded beyond currently protected
‘offline’ classes (and proxies thereof).
1 I would like to acknowledge the extremely helpful feedback received from the reviewers at Philosophy &
Technology in preparing this paper for publication.
2 ‘Big data’ may be the wrong term to describe such data. Correlations can be found between Bsmall amounts
of densely connected metadata^ that are not ‘big’ in terms of volume (Ananny 2016, 101).
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the need for group privacy
rights in analytics, including how a group identity is formed that attributes but is not
reducible to the individual identities of members. Section 3 then describes group
privacy as a right to inviolate personality. Theoretical challenges to this right are then
considered in Section 4, including an examination of what it means to be a rights-holder
and the case for ad hoc groups to be considered rights-holders in parallel to the privacy
rights of individuals. Section 5 then examines two models for implementing group
privacy protections, noting challenges for both. Section 6 concludes with reflections on
future work required to develop regulatory and technical protections for group privacy
interests.
2 Ethical Significance of Groups and Identity in Analytics
This paper addresses analytics systems involving algorithmic classification or grouping
of individuals to drive decision-making. Profiling algorithms identify correlations and
make predictions about behaviour at a group level, albeit with groups (or profiles) that
are constantly changing and redefined by the algorithm (Zarsky 2013). A simplistic
example of such a group is Bdog owners living in Wales aged 38–40 that exercise
regularly.^ Being identified as a member of this group could drive a variety of
automated decision-making with harmful or beneficial effects for individual members,
such as a preferential rate for health insurance.
It can be argued that analytics does not create such groups per se but rather assigns
weights or probabilities to inputs that represent individual data subjects. However,
grouping of individuals is a core and unavoidable technique in algorithmic classifica-
tion. Grouping can occur in two senses: either in the description of subjects or actions
taken on the basis of probabilities and predictive analytics. For the former, data subjects
must always be considered along a limited set of dimensions. Classifications are
defined along these dimensions. A very simplistic example will suffice: assume we
want to classify festival goers according to the festivals they have already attended
(perhaps for the sake of predicting which festivals they will attend in the future).
Assume we are considering two previous festivals, P and Q. Four possible groups of
festival goers emerge according to these dimensions: PQ (attended P and Q), PnQ
(attended P but not Q), nPQ (attended Q but not P), or nPnQ (attended neither P nor Q).
While a certain group may remain temporarily empty, for instance if we lack data on
any festival goers that have not attended either festival in question, the possible
groupings are limited according to the number of dimensions considered.
This logic applies to descriptive and predictive classifications; the number of
possible groups will always be derived from the number of dimensions under consid-
eration. For predictive analytics, dimensions can also refer to non-descriptive choices,
for instance the choice to deliver a certain advertisement due to observations of prior
actions. In this case, each data subject will be understood through a series of probabil-
ities in addition to observations; for instance, based on your attendance of festivals P
and Q and your expressed musical interests, we predict with 75% confidence that you
will attend festival R. Some may wish to argue that such probabilistic reasoning is not a
type of grouping. However, probabilities are calculated to drive decision-making or, at
a minimum, learn something about the data subject, i.e. to classify her for future
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decision-making. At the point, an action is taken on the basis of a probability, a group is
formed of all data subjects receiving the action, even if certainty is lacking that the
grouping is accurate. Once again, the possible range of actions, and thus groups, will be
limited by the dimensions under consideration.
Algorithmic classification can be considered a privacy invasive practice that is not
yet sufficiently regulated due to a prevailing regulatory focus on identifiable individ-
uals. Data must normally contain identifiers (e.g. name, address) to be legally classified
as personal and thus warrant stronger limits on processing and exchange (cf. European
Commission 2012). An individual’s capacity to manage data about herself ends once
identifiers are irretrievably removed.3 The individualistic focus of existing European
privacy protections incorrectly suggests that privacy cannot be violated without
identifiability.
Analytics raises a unique challenge for existing theories of privacy by creating
groups defined by identity tokens not reducible to, or owned by, individual members
of the group. In turn, traditional identifiers (e.g. name, address) are increasingly
irrelevant in analytics to learn something about people. Individuals can be clustered
according to behaviours, preferences and other characteristics without being identified
(van der Sloot 2014). Such methods find individuals interesting only to the extent that
they can be correlated with others (Floridi 2014; Vedder 1999); advertisers care not
who they are advertising to but whether their advertisements reach a target market.
Members of the group (e.g. a market segment) need not be identified but rather
classified to be effectively targeted. Connections between individuals revealing partic-
ular risks or behaviours are of interest, not the identifiable individual as such (Floridi
2014; Vedder 1999). Algorithmic classification tells us something about individuals
through their associations with ad hoc, ephemeral but insightful groups of allegedly
similar people.
Identifiability operates at two levels here. The individual’s offline identity consists of
the types of identifiers currently protected under data protection law (e.g. name,
address, national insurance number, unique identifier). Offline identities always de-
scribe one and only one unique person; they are a way to ensure a persistent record can
be assembled over time. The offline identity of the individual is irrelevant to the
formation of an ad hoc group and learning things about it.
In analytics systems, individuals also possess a profiling identity constructed from
connections with groups of other data subjects based upon dimensions (e.g. behaviours,
demographic attributes) deemed relevant (see Fig. 1). An individual has a profiling
identity consisting of all the ad hoc groups into which she is placed (see Fig. 2). The
features that define these groups are non-random behaviours and attributes, referred to
here as ‘behavioural identity tokens’ (cf. Grindrod 2014). Similar to some shared
offline identifiers (e.g. culture, ethnicity, post code), ownership of behavioural identity
tokens is distributed across members of the group (see Fig. 3). Actions by members can
change the tokens; a member defaulting on a loan can, for example, increase the
perceived risk of future loans to members. These changes, and decisions based upon
3 This is not entirely the case in the forthcoming EU General Data Protection Regulation. The definition of
personal data has been modified in the draft regulation to include pseudonymised data, where a link to
identifiers is maintained but held separately from the dataset.
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them (i.e. assigning a higher risk to the group), affect all members of the group
including members not yet observed by the analytics system.
Shared ownership of identity is largely ignored in data protection law (cf. Leese
2014; Hildebrandt 2011; Floridi 2012; Taylor et al. 2017). Existing legal protections
reflect piecemeal responses to particular egregious uses of shared offline identifiers in
decision-making, seen, for instance, in US anti-discrimination law (Barocas 2014) or
the ban on personalised insurance premiums based on risk profiling in the EU (Newell
and Marabelli 2015). Case-based regulation and detection of discriminatory decision-
making is feasible when the set of shared identifiers or groups to be legally protected
remains small. The challenge now faced is that analytics routinely creates shared
identifiers (i.e. behavioural identity tokens). Patterns and correlations used to group
individuals are functionally equivalent to identifiers (e.g. name, address) but are not
afforded comparable status under existing data protection law. Proxies for protected
attributes are not easy to predict or detect (Romei and Ruggieri 2014; Zarsky 2016),
particularly when algorithms access linked datasets (Barocas and Selbst 2015). Profiles
constructed from neutral characteristics such as postal code may inadvertently overlap
with other profiles related to ethnicity, gender, sexual preference and so on (Macnish
2012; Schermer 2011). Beyond legally protected groups, it remains unclear from the
outset the types of behavioural identity tokens and decision-making models that can be
produced, and which of these are potentially ethically troubling.4
Algorithmic classification may prove ethically problematic for a number of reasons.
It can, for example, reduce individual control of identity. The identities of individual
members are mediated by knowledge about the group. Groups are formed from
observables chosen at a particular level of abstraction for a particular purpose (cf.
Floridi 2008). Ad hoc groups are constructed from observables of interest to algorith-
mic classification systems, which produce a certain kind of knowledge (e.g. a recom-
mendation, rank, classification). These groups are imperfect reflections of the individ-
uals contained within, constrained by the types of question they are designed to answer,
and the flaws of the observables (i.e. the data) from which they are constructed. The
meaning given to a particular group, and thus imposed on the individual, will not
Fig. 1 Information exchanged to create a profiling identity
4 A particular type of algorithmic classification system—personalisation systems—provides an example as to
why algorithmic classification must be considered ethically relevant. Personalisation segments a population so
that only some groups are worthy of receiving certain opportunities or information, re-enforcing existing social
(dis)advantages. Personalisation systems create self-fulfilling behaviours and limit the opportunities available
to users according to their classification within the system (Macnish 2012; Leese 2014). Personalisation
Binvolves unseen, categorical, computational judgments about which searches, articles, or purchases should
probably come next^ (Ananny 2016, 103). Discrimination or social, economic and epistemic benefits of big
data can inadvertently localise around groups that offer easy or interesting analysis opportunities (Crawford
et al. 2014). Questions of the fairness and the distributive justice of such practices can be raised (Danna and
Gandy 2002; Rubel and Jones 2014; Cohen et al. 2014).
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necessarily reflect her self-understanding (Lupton 2014). Ad hoc grouping provides
unanticipated ways of viewing and inferring information about the individual. Algo-
rithmic classification must therefore be considered a threat to data subjects’ capacity to
shape and control identity.
The fair and equitable treatment of individuals is also undermined by predictive
analytics (cf. Newell and Marabelli 2015). If efficiency of a decision-making process
driven by analytics is the primary concern, decision-making that proves unfair to
Fig. 2 Profiling identity structure
Fig. 3 Shared ownership of behavioural identity tokens
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individuals will not necessarily be corrected.5 Further, it is difficult for lay data subjects
to notice and redress this type of unfair or harmful decision-making (Mittelstadt and
Floridi 2016). Systematic identification of the limitations of recorded data, or the set of
observables that inform algorithmic classification, and how these limitations are
reflected in models and decisions produced with analytics (Grindrod 2014) are hindered
by the opacity of analytics (Burrell 2016). Ad hoc groups are volatile (Leese 2014); the
subject’s representation in a classification scheme evolves over time, with new labels
applied, tweaked and removed as patterns are identified from new inputs. Memberships
can similarly change quickly. Ad hoc groups can overlap with observable groups (e.g.
likely voters for a political party), but with membership requirements based on
statistical correlations and relevant features of input data rather than attributes apparent
to members (e.g. party affiliation). Further, on the basis of irrelevant attributes, indi-
viduals may be treated differently from other individuals similar to them in all relevant
aspects.
Privacy, conceived as the right to control data about oneself, is an unrealistic ideal
under these conditions. The scale of the behavioural data produced in information
societies, the complexity of methods to make sense of it (Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016)
and the shared ownership of behavioural identity tokens all undermine efforts to protect
individual’s rights to privacy and identity with limits on processing of identifiable data.
Protections are required that respond to the inherent ethical uncertainty of algorithmic
classification and the emerging capacities to learn about individuals through knowledge
about the groups they are allocated.
3 Group Privacy as the Right to Inviolate Personality
To develop privacy protections responsive to advances in data analytics, an approach to
privacy is required that can address groups and shared identity. Group privacy as
conceived in the following sections is based on Luciano Floridi’s concept of an
informational identity (Floridi 2011) understood within his broader philosophy of
information (Floridi 2013b). When referring to group privacy, I am explicitly address-
ing the privacy of information that constitutes identity; a violation of informational
privacy disrespects an individual or group’s claim over information about itself.
This claim can be interpreted in many ways: to control, manage, own or prevent
access to information about the self. Traditionally, the damage caused by breaching
privacy has been linked in reductionist theories to its undesirable consequences (e.g.
distress or discrimination) or in ownership-based theories to the individual’s right to
exclusive use of information. Problems exist with both approaches (for a discussion,
see Floridi 2016a, b).
The alternative approach adopted here to describe group privacy, of privacy as
identity constitutive (Floridi 2011), connects privacy to the integrity of information
5 Zarsky (2016, 127–128) explains this point: BAs a result of the algorithmic process, individuals might be
treated differently than their peers—people similar to them in every relevant aspect—on the basis of irrelevant
differences…for some individuals (yet not enough to render the entire process inefficient), the factors are
irrelevant or incorrect. Thus, the process proves to be efficient overall, but in some instances, and for some
people, unfair…^
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constituting one’s identity (Floridi 2016a). While this is certainly not the only feasible
theoretical basis for the conceptual development of group privacy, it is adopted here
due to its suitability to the problem of shared ownership of identity-constituting tokens.
According to this approach, identity is constituted by information describing the
individual or group. Privacy is therefore a respect for the right to inviolate personality
(Warren and Brandeis 1890, 31) or the Bright to immunity from unknown, undesired, or
unintentional changes in one’s own identity as an informational entity, both actively and
passively^ (Floridi 2016a). According to this view, identity itself, and the information
constituting it, has a value independent of the role it plays in decision-making that
produces harmful or beneficial effects. The integrity of the subject’s identity is breached
when data or information is added to subject’s identity without consent. Breaches of
identity are considered an attack on the person who is constituted by her information.
A right to inviolate personality protects against the tendency in mature information
societies (Floridi 2016b) to produce a longitudinal, semi-permanent view of the
individual through data analytics, which would violate her right Bto be allowed to
experiment with one’s own life, to start again, without having records that mummify
one’s personal identity forever^ (Floridi 2006). Compared to offline decision-making,
algorithmic classification poses new restrictions on an individual’s capacity to shape
and alter identity over a lifetime, albeit with historical precedence. Breaches of the
integrity of identity are not limited to the online world; rather, the description of a group
privacy right in relation to data analytics and automated decision-making is a response
to an issue of the scale and persistence of breaches, rather than a fundamentally new
type of breach of the integrity of identity. The difference is that analytics allows for the
identities or beliefs at the basis of the choice architecture offered to the person not to be
limited to a single third party actor, but rather something that persists over time, travels
with the person between systems and affects future opportunities and treatment at the
hands of others. How a classification is reached is arguably irrelevant to the impact on
the data subject’s capacity to shape and alter identity over time and the power afforded
to decision-making entities to externally shape her identity. The accuracy of a
categorisation does not affect its persistence; so long, as the grouping is in place or
the categorisation applies to the subject, the subject retains an interest in the information
constituting it, even if the grouping proves to be inaccurate.
We can speak of the integrity of identity being breached in two senses. Active
breaches of identity involve replication and manipulation of the person’s identity within
a system. Passive breaches involve indirect pressure placed on the person to include
newly generated information in her identity, caused by a failure to obtain meaningful
consent for processing (Floridi 2006). Passive breaches describe potential future effects
on identity. A group member’s self-perception will not necessarily be affected by
information about the group due to a lack of self-awareness (i.e. she does not know
she is a member) or a small effect size (e.g. the disturbance of a poorly targeted
advertisement). The right to inviolate personality is, nevertheless, passively breached
in both cases because information that will potentially affect the individual or group’s
identity in the future has been generated.
Algorithmic classification primarily produces passive breaches of identity. Members of
ad hoc groups will struggle to become self-aware regarding the group’s existence due to
the opacity, secrecy and ubiquity of analytics in information societies (cf. Leese 2014;
Hildebrandt 2008). It is for this reason that ad hoc grouping poses a different challenge to
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identity management than membership of offline collectives or ascriptive groups (see
Section 4.1) in which self-awareness and collective agency are possible. Pragmatically,
third party usage of information that constitutes identity is unpredictable; focusing a
privacy right on the integrity of identity made up of this information, rather than the
effects of its usage, is therefore required to ensure privacy is protected independent of the
capacity to observe and correct for harmful effects of data processing.
Floridi’s approach is preferred because it formalises the harm to identity caused by
third parties that create actionable knowledge about groups. An ad hoc group’s identity
consists of the classifications and rules constructed by an algorithmic classification
system (i.e. why you are a member of this particular group), along with predictions of
unobserved or future collective preferences and behaviours. This identity is viewed by
the system itself and decision-making processes influenced by its outputs. Opportuni-
ties to protect identity require awareness of when, where and how this identity is
crafted. Both an individual and group’s right to inviolate personality can therefore be
violated when identity is crafted externally, without either’s consent or awareness.
Floridi compares this process to kidnapping: Bthe observed is moved to an observer’s
local space of observation (a space which is remote for the observed), unwillingly and
possibly unknowingly. What is abducted is personal information, even though no actual
removal of information is in question, but rather only a cloning of the relevant piece of
personal information^ (Floridi 2006). The production of information that modifies identity
is considered a disrespectful attack on identity. Analytics is precisely this: the individual’s
identity (as contained in the system’s inputs) is temporarily kidnapped and modified
through classifications that reveal something new about the person (cf. Hildebrandt
2008). External identity construction breaches the individual’s inviolate personality.
The privacy right described by Floridi is a fundamental right, meaning the starting
point for any negotiation over privacy should start from a position of respecting the
right (Floridi 2006). As Floridi (2016a) notes, in contrast to reductionist theories which
allow for privacy to be overridden through consequentialist appeals, the identity-
constituting approach starts from the position that the right should be respected.
Fundamental rights cannot be negated as such by consequentialist appeals but can,
nonetheless, be waived through negotiation or consent from the rights-holder or
breached due to overriding interests. This is not the same as the reductionist approach:
where consent is not obtained, meaning Bunknown, undesired, or unintentional^
changes to identity occur, the subject’s privacy right is breached. Grounds for justifiable
breaches under special circumstances can of course be identified, but this does not alter
the fact that a breach of privacy has occurred.
It is questionable whether agreement mechanisms governing many digital sources of
data (e.g. privacy policies and terms and conditions) grant meaningful consent. Similarly,
consent does nothing to address the cumulative effects of knowledge generated through
analytics on social and organisational decision-making processes (e.g. healthcare commis-
sioning). Processing of aggregated or anonymised data remains unfettered.
4 Group Privacy in Practice
Group privacy as a right to inviolate personality aims to protect the integrity of a
group’s identity, which is non-reducible (i.e. not merely a sum of the identities of
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members). If protections of group privacy are introduced as a way to correct the
imbalance of power created by the proliferation of data analytics (i.e. the power of
third parties to shape and control a data subject’s identity), three interpretations of the
concept come to mind.
A strong interpretation would allow for rights-holders to make claims over any data
processing that generates identity-constitutive information via algorithmic classification
(cf. Altman 1977). A strong right would equate to the control of third party data
processors and algorithmic classification systems. This approach would create new
conflict points for data processors and subjects.
A weakened but practically feasible interpretation recognises the claims of rights-
holders over identity-constitutive data processing as valid but limits them to oversight,
not control. A duty would thus be created for data processors to keep rights-holders in
the loop. This moderate interpretation differs from existing rights and duties enshrined
in EU data protection law in the sense that it validates the individual’s claim to
information about the groups to which she nominally belongs, either as a rights-
holder or member of a rights-holding group.
A weak interpretation denies the rights-holders any claim to control how third
parties form views about her. On this view, a weak right to group privacy would be
one of enhancement only, meaning data processors have a non-binding duty to educate
data subjects about how their data trails mediate their experiences within analytics-
driven decision-making.
4.1 Types of Rights and Rights-Holders
Note that the term ‘rights-holder’ is preferred here to ‘group’ or ‘individual’ in recognition
that a right to group privacy can feasibly be held by either. To establish ad hoc groups as
legitimate holders of a right to group privacy, it is first necessary to examine in what sense
groups can have interests and rights. We can speak of two types of rights: moral and legal.
Moral rights establish duties for agents to respect the interests of a patient. In turn, legal
rights are moral rights enacted by law, specifying protected interests of moral patients and
concomitant duties for moral agents (Jones 2016). Here, we will first consider whether ad
hoc groups can be granted amoral right to privacy. Later, wewill examine how amoral right
can be enacted as a legal right to group privacy (see Section 5).
The nature and validity of group rights is a long-standing problem in political philosophy
(Jones 2016). The debate does not concern whether certain groups should have rights and
interests in practice, but rather which types of groups are valid rights-holders. Rights held by
groups (i.e. a group right) are not reducible to the rights of members; it is a right held by a
group qua group. Members of the group can also be granted individual rights due to their
membership in the group, seen, for instance, in rights and privileges granted tomembers of a
social club. Such rights are not group rights as discussed here; rather, a group right is
attributed to the group itself, not individual members (Floridi 2016a).
According to how membership is established, three types of groups can be
recognised as potential rights-holders:
& Collectives—a group intentionally joined due to collective interests, shared back-
ground or other explicit common traits and purposes (examples patient advocacy
group, labour unions)
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& Ascriptive groups—a group whose membership is determined by inherited or
incidentally developed characteristic. Ascriptive groups cannot normally be inten-
tionally joined or left without redefining the boundaries of the group (examples
ethnic groups, patient cohorts)
& Ad hoc groups—a group whose membership is assembled for a third party interest
according to perceived links between members, often for a time- or purpose-limited
period with volatile membership requirements (examples market segments, profil-
ing groups)
Collectives and ascriptive groups are already legally recognised as legitimate rights-
holders in some contexts. Collective rights include the right to self-determination held
by nations, or legal rights granted to corporations (List and Pettit 2011). Prior work on
group privacy has established a right for labour unions, understood as collectives, to
assemble (Bloustein 1976). Anti-discrimination law protects groups or protected clas-
ses from disparate impact in social and political decision-making (Barocas and Selbst
2015). Other examples include prohibitions on genetic discrimination (Natowicz et al.
1992) and protections of minority cultural and linguistic traditions. In contrast, ad hoc
groups are not yet recognised as deserving of legally enshrined privacy rights.
Rights can be granted to groups on the basis of several characteristics. As revealed
by the aforementioned examples of rights held by collectives and ascriptive groups,
collective identity and agency are often considered minimal requirements for the
possession of group rights.
Collective identity can refer to both a reducible identity aggregated from the
independent identities of members (such that the group’s identity necessarily changes
when members leave) and a non-reducible identity held by the group itself. Institutions
show how collectives can possess this latter type of non-reducible group identity; sports
clubs, for instance, have an identity (e.g. history, norms) and interests independent of
the identities and interests of their membership which changes over time (French 1984).
Collective agency refers to the capacity to act to fulfil or protect the interests of the
group. Needs and interests are shared between members insofar as Bwhat benefits or
harms any member must benefit or harm all^ (Jones 2016). Agency requires self-
awareness: groups cannot act in their best interests without first being aware that the
group exists. All members of a collective will by definition possess self-awareness.
However, for ascriptive groups, self-awareness is required only at the group level;
genealogy, for instance, demonstrates how members of an ascriptive group can be
ignorant of inherited traits and cultural history.
4.2 Ad Hoc Groups as Rights-Holders
Ad hoc groups lack both collective identity and agency. They are assembled by
algorithmic classification systems as types of individuals with common characteristics
(Floridi 2014) as opposed to common intentions, which suggests a lack of self-
awareness, collective interests or agency. Ad hoc groups are created by a third party
that links a set of individuals according to perceived similarities (French 1984). An
identity can be imposed on members unaware that they belong to the group. The third
party interests in the formation of ad hoc groups also need not be long term: ad hoc
groups need last only long enough to answer a question posed by a data processor. Both
From Individual to Group Privacy in Big Data Analytics
characteristics undermine any ascription of collective agency or intentionality.6 Ad hoc
groups are thus unique insofar as they are externally crafted and lack the intentionality
and self-awareness of legally protected groups.
Collective identity and collective agency are not, however, absolute requirements for
groups to hold rights. Instead, moral patienthood may prove sufficient. For a group
itself to hold a right, it must Bpossess a moral standing that is not reducible to the
standing of its members^ to possess rights (Jones 2016). Moral patienthood establishes
precisely this moral standing.
Thresholds for patienthood vary. A strict anthropocentric view grants patienthood
only to fellow moral agents (cf. Wellman 1995). In contrast, the mere possession of a
Breason to regard a group as an object of moral concern^ (Jones 2016), such as the
recognition of collective interests, may itself provide sufficient reason to treat an entity
as a moral patient. Similarly, particular capacities can serve as a minimal threshold, for
instance the capacity to suffer (cf. Singer 1993) or be harmed by entropy as an
informational object (cf. Floridi 2013a).
On all but the strict anthropocentric view, ad hoc groups can be moral patients (Floridi
2013b). Floridi (2016a) argues that groups can be rights-holders by the same logic that
rights are attributed to individuals, so long as the group itself is treated as an individual (cf.
corporate personhood). According to him, groups serve the same role as individuals in
interactions involving the exchange of information. Rights can simultaneously be held by
the individual and the individual’s group as long as identity-forming interactions exist at
both levels. If these interactions constitute the group’s identity (as is the case for individuals),
then groups can be recognised as possessing an interest in controlling that identity. This
interest can be formally recognised as a group right to inviolate identity (Floridi 2016a),
even if the group cannot itself act to control that identity. Agency can be hypothetically
attributed to ad hoc groups if third party processors act to respect interests the group would
presumably have if self-aware. Presumed interests can be based upon observed interests of
individual members, for instance the interest to be accurately classified according to their
data. This is not to say the group’s interests are reducible to the interests of members, but
rather that an educated guess can be made about what the group would value if given the
opportunity to assemble and act collectively.
In the case of ad hoc groups, identity-forming interactions involving the group and
individual members intersect due to shared ownership of behavioural identity tokens
(see Figs. 1, 2 and 3). The behaviours of individuals produce data used to define an
actionable group. Actions taken by members affect the interests of the whole group due
to the predictive power attributed to the algorithmic classifications; the group is
actionable in the sense that members have been observed (or perceived) to be similar
and are thus predicted to behave or respond to stimuli (e.g. advertisements) similarly in
the future. As a result, the group as a whole has a claim to the tokens used to define it
and guide future actions taken towards it. Individual members do not retain an
exclusive claim to their data trails once algorithmically grouped.
6 With that being said, persistent profiling identities can be extremely valuable in analytics. The profiling
identity, as a record of one’s ad hoc group memberships, is akin to a digital permanent record that reflects
one’s identity within one or more linked algorithmic classification systems. An electronic health record linked
across GPs, hospitals and other facilities that describes a patient’s personal health risks is but one example.
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From this brief discussion, ad hoc groups can tentatively be treated as moral patients
and thus valid rights-holders. 7 Regardless of practical feasibility, this conclusion
helpfully emphasises the co-existence of non-reducible group and individual identities,
as well as privacy interests. However, even if granted rights, ad hoc groups cannot act
to protect their interests due to a lack of collective agency and self-awareness. Consid-
eration is therefore required of how to enact formal protections of group privacy on
behalf of ad hoc groups.
5 Two Implementation Models
Two existing legal instruments demonstrate how the interests of groups can be protected
when collective action is infeasible: American class action and anti-discrimination law. In
class action lawsuits, a group (represented by a plaintiff) seeks compensation from an
organisation based around a violation of the rights or interests of the group (e.g. an interest in
product safety). Similar to algorithmic classification, the group does not exist prior to the
lawsuit; the lawsuit provides a purpose around which the group is assembled.
Let us consider the hypothetical example of a fault identified in the safety harnesses
of a particular model of automobile. In this case, the group consists of all owners of that
type of car. The class action group does not exist before the lawsuit in the sense that a
reason does not yet exist for it to be formed. The formation of class action groups, as
with ad hoc groups, is abstract; the group does not meet or interact but is rather legally
assembled by a third party (the plaintiff) for a well-defined purpose (the lawsuit). The
plaintiff seeks compensation on behalf of the group; similarly, the data processor
undertakes knowledge work on behalf of the group that has been assembled by a
classifier algorithm. Critically, only the group can act to pursue its interests; individual
members cannot separately pursue personal interests within a class action lawsuit.
A similar mechanism can be found in American anti-discrimination law concerning
disparate impact. According to the principle of disparate impact,8 actions in employ-
ment, housing, policing and other areas are considered discriminatory and illegal if
protected classes of people (e.g. groups based on race, gender, religion) suffer dispro-
portionate adverse impact compared to non-members.9 Critically, the legality of the
action is determined by the distribution of impact across a population (i.e. not only the
7 This issue requires further contextualisation within theories of political and legal rights, which goes beyond
the scope of this paper. Furthermore, it may largely be a semantic point due to ad hoc groups lacking self-
awareness and collective agency. In both cases, the possession of a moral right creates duties for agents to
respect the rights-holders’ interests in inviolate personality. Even if a right to group privacy is only held by
individual members, the possession of equivalent rights by all group members provides a check on the power
of any individual member to exercise control over the group’s identity.
8 An in-depth discussion of disparate impact and detection of discrimination in data analytics can be found in
Barocas and Selbst (2015). A discussion of the legal origin of the principle of disparate impact in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is provided by Rutherglen (1987).
9 The discussion of anti-discrimination law is limited here to the principle of disparate impact. However, as
Zarsky (2016) notes, at least two other types of discrimination can arise in analytics: (1) the explicit usage of
protected characteristics (e.g. race) to inform decisions and (2) the usage of biased or skewed datasets that
discriminate against protected groups, often resulting from Bhuman biases in measurement or other past
wrongs that might lead to over-representation of some forms of negative data about minorities^. For a
discussion of further types of discrimination in analytics, see Romei and Ruggieri (2014).
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affected groups). The method and rationale of the action are irrelevant to its legality.
Attention is paid only to the effects of the action to prevent discrimination against
protected classes through proxy features (e.g. post code as a proxy for ethnicity).10
Disparate impact doctrine differs from algorithmic classification in that protected classes
are legally well-defined prior to the identification of adverse impact. While the character-
istics driving the search for adverse impact are defined in advance, the actual groups are not;
the group ‘African Americans’ is a legally protected class, but a group relevant to disparate
impact analysis, such as ‘AfricanAmericans subjected to disproportionate adverse impact in
social housing in Brooklyn’, is not assembled before adverse impact is identified.
Both examples provide precedents for the protection of group privacy interests. Group
privacy is closely related to protection of equality through anti-discrimination law insofar
individuals are protected in both cases from unfair treatment on the basis of actual or inferred
attributes. However, group privacy based on the right to inviolate personality specifically
aims to protect against (1) unwarranted third party manipulation of identity and (2) harms
from automated decision-making based upon profiling identities assembled by third parties.
Ad hoc groups differ from protected classes in that they need not be based on
intuitive features or parameters (Burrell 2016). Analytics allows for a new type of
group to be formed that is not protected by anti-discrimination provisions, because the
groups need not align with existing protected classes or attributes, such as those
addressed in fairness- and discrimination-aware analytics (e.g. Romei and Ruggieri
2014; Kroll et al. 2016; Ajunwa et al. 2016). Rather, the defining features of an ad hoc
group are algorithmically determined and, thus, not necessarily observable or interpret-
able to humans. Anti-discrimination mechanisms built around offline identifiers are
thus insufficient to protect groups constructed by algorithmic systems from harmful
decisions based on attributes that are not merely proxies for legally protected attributes
(e.g. ethnicity, gender). The future development of priacy-, fairness-, and
discrimination-aware analytics techniques should address this fact and expand their
scope of concern beyond legally protected classes and proxies thereof.
Generically, protections of group privacy can assist in predicting, detecting and
remedying invasive classifications and in preventing access to some data types for
particular purposes. Class action and disparate impact point towards a possible imple-
mentation model for group privacy protections, i.e. reactive recourse mechanisms to
detect and compensate for violations of a group’s privacy interests.
Reactive protections are concerned with ex post detection of classifications that
attack a group’s informational identity. Reactive protections can (1) provide recourse or
compensation to groups when invasive classifications are detected or (2) correct
classification systems that subject groups to disproportionate adverse impact (e.g.
targeted risk profiling). As with individual informational privacy, oversight allows
group members to anticipate and respond to the ways in which beliefs about the group
mediate their experiences as individuals.11 Oversight in this sense would empower
10 Targeted policing through an algorithmic analysis of crime statistics provides an example; focusing on
crime hot spots can disproportionately expose particular ethnic and socioeconomic groups to police scrutiny
(cf. Harcourt 2006). The rationality and desirability of preventing crime by targeting high crime areas have no
bearing on whether such systems are considered discriminatory.
11 These interests are supported by requirements in the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and
forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation for data processors to explain the decision-making logic of
automated processing when queried (European Commission 2012).
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groups to assess the acceptability of algorithmic classification for different processing
contexts and data types.
Proactive protections are also feasible to (1) predict and prevent the assembly of
certain types of profiles or groups, (2) prevent classifier algorithms from being applied
to certain types of questions or purposes or (3) prevent classifier algorithms from being
provided with inputs containing protected attributes (Barocas and Selbst 2015), such as
gender or ethnicity (Calders et al. 2009; Kamiran and Calders 2010; Schermer 2011).
Such protections address the problem of information overload, the overwhelming effort
required to control one’s data in the information age, by setting particular data types and
questions off limits.
5.1 Challenges
Both models face several challenges. Proactive protections may be preferable due to ad
hoc groups lacking self-awareness and collective agency. Recourse mechanisms cannot
be accessed by individuals unaware they are members. A collective voice does not exist
within ad hoc groups. This challenge is overcome in anti-discrimination law, which
proactively restricts processing of protected types of data and processing for discrim-
inatory purposes. Demographic groups cannot assemble and debate the merits of
processing; control is exercised as a legislative level (often including representatives
of the group that can speak, presumably coherently, about the interests of the group),
not by individual members of the group.
While nominally a vote in favour of proactive protections, this lack of unified voice
can also support a reactive model. Individual and group interests in privacy can
conflict. Groups can make judgments that are not derived or equivalent to the sum of
members’ individual judgments (List and Pettit 2011). However, deliberation cannot
occur within a group whose members are not aware of one another. As a result,
prohibitions can easily come to unfairly represent a particularly motivated individual’s
views rather than the interests of the group. Algorithms and ex post accountability
mechanisms can be designed to protect the privacy of individuals, without offering any
protection to groups or group identity (i.e. the group’s inviolate personality). Prohibi-
tion of certain types of classification or inputs is also risky when their potential utility is
uncertain; beneficial processing could easily be blocked by blunt regulation (cf.
Nissenbaum 2004).
Anti-discrimination law demonstrates the difficulty of blanket prohibitions on ana-
lytics to protect group privacy interests. The EU takes a principled systematic approach
to anti-discrimination, identifying types of discrimination as illegal across all data
processing contexts. Elsewhere, for instance in the USA or Australia, a piecemeal
approach is taken, with specific forms of discrimination outlawed in response to
problems arising in specific contexts, such as housing or credit decisions (Romei and
Ruggieri 2014). Rational preventative measures to protect group privacy would take a
principled, universal approach, given the non-territorial, trans-national and persistent
nature of data analytics and the models and profiles produced therein.
One response to the difficulties faced by proactive protections is to limit group
privacy protections to recourse; rather than attempt to predict something that is highly
uncertain, effort should focus on developing methods to identify and compensate
violations of a group’s privacy interests. Class action and disparate impact both provide
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models for group recourse. As a reactive concept, group privacy provides an alternative
route for individuals to maintain their informational identity, even when the link
between the individual’s privacy and the data has been lost through anonymisation.
Reactive protections are not without comparable challenges. A primary problem
with reactive group privacy concerns the difficulty of detecting violations of group
interests. Detection is made possible in anti-discrimination and class action law because
the areas to which they are applicable (e.g. social housing, product safety) and the
groups of people they are intended to protect (i.e. legally protected classes) are well
defined; the search for disparate impact can start, for instance, with housing statistics
for protected groups in a particular geographical location.
Further work is required to establish initial anchor points for the detection of group
privacy violations. 12 Generically, a violation occurs when the group’s identity is
changed by unwanted information. How this occurs in practice is not well established.
Prior work on the rights of collectives in international law provides some idea (e.g.
Bloustein 1976; Bisaz 2012). High profile examples of invasive profiling are also
helpful. However, these sources alone are insufficient to develop a general taxonomy of
violations. Ethically problematic profiling tends to only be identified when the system
fails spectacularly and in public. Mundane violations that indicate a cumulative effect
on identity (e.g. displaying the wrong advertisement) are harder to record. Auditing
functions built into analytics systems may go some way to solving this problem by
allowing for ex post detection of violations through examination of the inputs and
decision-making rules resulting in a problematic decision (cf. Sandvig et al. 2014;
Zarsky 2016; Mittelstadt et al. 2016).
Detection mechanisms, however, face problems stemming from the complexity and
opacity of analytics systems (Zarsky 2016). As discussed above (see Section 4.2), ad
hoc groups are comparable to the type of groups and interests protected in class action
and anti-discrimination law. However, they differ in one critical aspect. Disparate
impact occurs when (1) evidence of disproportionate adverse impact is uncovered,
affecting (2) a well-defined group (e.g. a protected class). Uncertainty is high for the
first component (evidence can be sought in innumerable places) but low for the second
because the law applies only to particular protected groups. Disparate impact is a
feasible recourse mechanism precisely because the affected groups are defined accord-
ing to intuitive characteristics (e.g. ethnicity, product ownership). Ad hoc groups are
not similarly intuitive, defined instead by machine interpretable correlations (cf. Burrell
2016; Lisboa 2013). A comparable form of recourse for group privacy violations would
be substantially more complex because both components are highly uncertain, owing to
the opacity of analytics systems.
Constructing appropriate channels for feedback and recourse is, nonetheless, partic-
ularly important to protect group privacy in the future. Understanding how automated
and bureaucratic decision-making amplifies the political power of decision-making
organisations and disempowers data subjects in the process will be a key to designing
appropriate recourse mechanisms. The complexity of automated decision-making
amplifies the impact of classifications on both individual and group identity. Interpret-
able or low-dimensional decision-making can similarly restrict an individual’s identity
12 For a discussion of the lack of evidence of harms arising from data misuse in the context of biomedical
processing, see Laurie et al. (2014).
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over time if a classification is persistent; being classified as ‘black’ on the basis of one’s
ancestry can, for instance, have equivalent effects on future choices and treatment by
others, without involving complex decision-making methods. However, highly com-
plex and poorly interpretable algorithmic decision-making adds an extra barrier to
controlling one’s identity in the face of such classifications. The subject must overcome
not only the bureaucratic and organisational power that makes such classifications
persistent over time, but is also less able to challenge the classification if its rationale or
underlying evidence cannot be understood and, therefore, questioned. The forthcoming
General Data Protection Regulation addresses this problem insofar as it specifies vague
rights and duties for data subjects and data controllers concerning automated decision-
making. The eventual interpretation of these provisions will ideally build upon an
understanding of the relationship between automated and bureaucratic decision-mak-
ing.13
One way to address these challenges is to identify processing contexts, purposes and
data types that allow violations of inviolate personality to be negotiated with affected
group(s). The relative strength of a group’s privacy interests will vary between pro-
cessing contexts. While the right to inviolate personality is absolute in principle, in
practice, it must be balanced with individual privacy rights and the social, commercial
and epistemic benefits of data processing. It is thus not, in principle, an additional
barrier to data processing but rather a third set of considerations for ethical assessment
of analytics platforms. Group privacy could, for instance, support the introduction of
consultations with patient cohorts as a complement to existing individualistic privacy
and consent mechanisms in biomedical research involving analytics.
6 Conclusion
Advances in data analytics necessitate new protections for the privacy interests of ad
hoc groups formed by algorithmic classification. Mechanisms are required to protect
the privacy interests of groups independent of the interests of their individual members.
The privacy interests of ad hoc groups are not reducible to the interests of members due
to shared ownership of behavioural identity tokens. It is these tokens, as opposed to
information about a unique individual, that mediate the individual’s treatment within a
given analytics system. Each individual thus has a valid claim to the tokens constituting
the group’s identity.
The group’s identity is not, however, reducible to the identities of individual
members, which are defined by a far greater set of identity tokens than those that
define the group. If an ad hoc group possesses a non-reducible identity, interests can be
ascribed to the maintenance of this identity. Protecting privacy by hiding the identity of
the subject of processing does not therefore address how algorithmic classifiers make
sense individuals.
As suggested by the depth of philosophical work on group rights,14 establishing ad
hoc groups as valid rights-holders is a too complex problem to fully explore here. The
intention here has not been to make this case in full, but rather to argue that ad hoc
13 This is a complex but important issue that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
14 See Jones (2016) for an overview.
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groups possess privacy interests not reducible to those of members, despite lacking
collective agency and self-awareness. If it is decided that ad hoc groups cannot hold
rights, the protections described here (see Section 5) would need to be linked to or
based on the rights of individuals, or an ethical duty imposed on data processors. This
important theoretical issue requires further attention.
The forthcoming EU General Data Protection Regulation includes provisions for
data subjects to request information about the logic involved in automated, algorithmic
decision-making. This may prove a turning point for legal recognition of group privacy
rights.15 As shown by the difficulty of detecting group privacy violations, practical
implementation of this right will be extremely difficult. Going forward, ad hoc groups
should be formally recognised as moral patients in data protection law and privacy
theory. The privacy interests of ad hoc groups must be recognised to ensure privacy
adapts to advances in the ways we make sense of each other through the data we create.
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